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DLD-184 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4650
___________
JUAN DAVILA-BAJANA,
                                                             Appellant
v.
JAMES F. SHERMAN, (EX) WARDEN; RODNEY SMITH, HEALTH SERVICES
ADMINISTRATOR; DENNIS OLSON, MEDICAL DOCTOR; D. SCOTT DODRILL,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR; HARRELL WATTS, ADMINISTRATOR; UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND PROFESSIONAL
CAPACITIES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-197-E)
District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 17, 2008
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 21, 2008)
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Juan Davila-Bajana, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
     Dr. Olson, the Clinical Director at FCI-McKean, defined Davila-Bajana’s condition1
as follows:
Hammertoe is a toe that’s curled due to a bend in the middle joint of a toe.
Hammertoe can cause the toe to press against the top of the toe box of the
shoe, causing pain and pressure.  In addition, pain may result from a hard
growth of skin (corn) on the top of the toe that can form where the toe rubs
against the shoe.  Pain may also result from calluses that develop under the
tip of the toe or on the ball of the foot.  
(Decl. of Dennis Olson, M.D., at n.3, Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 15-6.)  
2
Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for
summary judgment.  Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
Davila-Bajana is, and at all relevant times was, incarcerated at the Federal
Correctional Institution at McKean, Pennsylvania (“FCI-McKean”).  In October 2003,
Davila-Bajana injured a toe while playing handball at the prison.  Prison medical staff
examined the toe, took x-rays, and diagnosed him with a “strain/sprain.”  (Decl. of Dennis
Olson, M.D., at ¶ 3, Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 15-6.)  Over the course of the following four
months, prison medical staff treated Davila-Bajana for his injury on numerous occasions
by, for example, taping the toe, prescribing anti-inflammatory medications, and providing
gel-pads and band-aids.  In February 2004, prison medical staff referred Davila-Bajana to
an orthopedic surgeon who diagnosed him with a “hammertoe deformity.”   The surgeon1
gave Davila-Bajana a cortisone injection, recommended Motrin for the discomfort, and
taught him several stretching exercises.  The surgeon indicated that if the deformity
3persisted, Davila-Bajana may need surgical correction.       
Prison medical staff continued to treat the injured toe on a monthly basis.  During
this time, Davila-Bajana complained that he was not receiving adequate medical attention
and that his condition required surgical intervention.  As a result, in September 2004, he
was referred for another orthopedic consultation to determine whether surgery was
necessary.  Because the orthopedic surgeon who had originally examined Davila-Bajana
was no longer available, he saw a different surgeon.  This second surgeon diagnosed him
with hammertoe, Morton’s foot (an inflamed nerve in the ball of the foot), a long second
toe, and osteoarthritis in the big toe.  The surgeon recommended that Davila-Bajana wear
a longer shoe with a metatarsal bar to relieve the pain, and noted that this solution would
be “a lot easier than doing surgery.”  Accordingly, prison medical personnel provided
Davila-Bajana with two metatarsal bars.  Dr. Olson, the Clinical Director at FCI-McKean,
concluded that these non-surgical accommodations were sufficient because there was “no
clinical indication that corrective foot surgery [was] medically necessary.”  (Id. ¶ 8.) 
Nonetheless, Davila-Bajana continued to demand surgical intervention.         
In September 2006, Davila-Bajana commenced a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
concerning the allegedly inadequate medical treatment he received for his toe injury.  The
complaint named as defendants: Dr. Olson; Rodney Smith, Health Services
Administrator; James Sherman, Warden; Scott Dodrill, the Regional Director of the
     The complaint also contained a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, but2
Davila-Bajana later withdrew this claim. 
     We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  3
4
Northeast Regional Office of the Bureau of Prisons; Harrell Watts, Administrator of the
Office of General Counsel of the Bureau of Prisons; and the United States of America.  In
the complaint, Davila-Bajana alleged that: (1) the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the United
States is liable to him under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for its negligent
implementation of prison policy and negligent training of prison employees.   Davila-2
Bajana sought injunctive relief as well as money damages.    
On January 8, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,
motion for summary judgment.  The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge who
recommended that the court grant the motion.  The District Court agreed and, by order
entered December 4, 2007, adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation
and dismissed Davila-Bajana’s complaint.  The present appeal followed.   3
A. The Eighth Amendment Claim
Upon review, we conclude that the District Court’s dismissal of Davila-Bajana’s
Eighth Amendment claim was proper.  First, the District Court properly concluded that
there was an insufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find in
Davila-Bajana’s favor on his Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Olson and
Administrator Smith.  The conditions under which deprivation of medical treatment
5violates a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights are well established; only “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain” or “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs” of
prisoners are sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  Allegations of negligent treatment are
medical malpractice claims, and do not trigger constitutional protections.  Id. at 105-06. 
“[M]ere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” is also insufficient.  Monmouth
County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).   
The crux of Davila-Bajana’s Eighth Amendment claim is that the prison’s course
of treatment was too conservative; according to Davila-Bajana, the prison medical staff
inappropriately “substituted their decision in lieu of the specialist’s prescription [for
surgical correction].”  (Compl. at ¶ 25-26.)  These allegations do not support a
constitutional violation.  See, e.g., White v. Napolean, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“Certainly, no claim is presented when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment
of another doctor.  There may, for example, be several ways acceptable to treat an
illness.”).  Furthermore, as the Magistrate Judge explained, the medical records reveal
that Davila-Bajana was under continuous care for over two and one-half years for his toe
injury.  Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that Dr. Olson and
Administrator Smith were entitled to summary judgment on Davila-Bajana’s Eighth
Amendment claim against them.        
We also agree with the District Court that Davila-Bajana failed to state a claim
6against defendants Sherman, Dodrill and Watts.  Davila-Bajana alleged that these
officials were responsible for his medical treatment because they reviewed the
administrative grievances he filed concerning his medical care, and were otherwise
responsible for the general care and custody of the prisoners.  A non-medical prison
administrator cannot, however, become responsible for medical treatment solely by virtue
of reviewing an inmate grievance.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding that, absent a reason to believe that prison doctors are mistreating a prisoner, a
non-medical prison official will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter
requirement of deliberate indifference); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir.
1993) (granting summary judgment to non-medical prison officials whose involvement
with prisoner’s healthcare was limited to failing to respond to prisoner’s letters explaining
his predicament).  Furthermore, it is well established that liability under section 1983
cannot be predicated solely on a theory of respondeat superior.  See Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 376 (1976).  Therefore, we conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed
Davila-Bajana’s Eighth Amendment claim against these defendants.    
B. The FTCA Claim
We also agree with the District Court that it lacked jurisdiction over Davila-
Bajana’s negligence claim against the United States.  In the complaint, Davila-Bajana
alleged that the United States was liable under the FTCA for the negligent
implementation of prison policy and employee training.  However, in order for the
     In light of our conclusion that the District Court properly dismissed Davila-Bajana’s4
complaint, we find that the District Court properly denied as moot Davila-Bajana’s
motions for preliminary injunction and funds for expert witness.   
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District Court to exercise jurisdiction over this FTCA claim, Davila-Bajana must have
first presented the claim, in writing and within two years after its accrual, to the
appropriate federal agency.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), 2675(a); Deutsch v. United States,
67 F.3d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1995).  Davila-Bajana failed to do so.  Although the record
reflects that Davila-Bajana did attempt to file an administrative tort claim concerning his
medical care, he never initiated an administrative claim alleging negligent implementation
of policy and/or employee training. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1c, at Dist. Ct. Dkt. No.
15-5.)  Therefore, the District Court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear this
claim.       4
Accordingly, as there is no substantial question presented by this appeal, we will
summarily affirm.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
